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I. INTRODUCTION 
A controversial debate within United States patent law shows no 
signs of a quick resolution and divides inventors, companies, and 
practitioners in the field.  Within a broader discussion of patent 
reform, issues about damages awards for patent infringement contin-
ue to be contentious.  On one side, interested parties argue that 
modern legislation is needed to control the costs of litigation and 
tighten the standards for calculating damages awards.
1
  On the other 
side, opponents counter that no evidence indicates that damages 
reform is necessary.
2
  The outcome will significantly affect a number 
of industries involved with the patent system. 
Under U.S. patent law, which is the source of the damages de-
bate, the rights of inventors and patentees tend to expand and con-
tract over time.
3
  Although patent rights have strengthened over the 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Criminal Jus-
tice, 2007, Rutgers University.  The author wishes to thank Professor David Opder-
beck, Jamie Gottlieb, Seth Fersko, and Salvatore Abbruzzese for their invaluable sug-
gestions. 
 1 See, e.g., Patent Reform in the 111th Congress: Legislation and Recent Court Decisions: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5–8 (2009) [hereinafter Patent 
Reform] (statement of Steven R. Appleton, Chairman & Chief Executive Officer, Mi-
cron Technology, Inc.), available at http://www.patentfairness.org/pdf/ 
appleton_20090310.pdf. 
 2 See, e.g., id. at 11–13 (statement of Philip S. Johnson, Chief Intellectual Proper-
ty Counsel, Johnson & Johnson), available at http://www.patentsmatter.com/issue/ 
pdfs/20090310_johnson_testimony.pdf. 
 3 Compare Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307, 309, 310 (1980) (con-
struing patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 broadly to include a human-
made strain of bacteria), with In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949, 951, 963–66 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (en banc) (holding that a “method of hedging risk in the field of commodities 
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last several decades,
4
 the scope of those rights has begun to narrow.  
One important sign of this trend is a series of opinions by the Su-
preme Court of the United States that shrink the sphere of patent 
protection.
5
  Other recent developments include several congression-
al attempts at legislative patent reform.
6
  Legislative-reform proposals 
are especially noteworthy, as the present patent laws date back to the 
Patent Act of 1952.
7
 
Although patent-reform efforts stalled in the past, the value of 
intellectual property to the United States promises major changes.
8
  
Indeed, the Patent Reform Act of 2009 (2009 Act),
9
 demonstrates by 
 
trading” is not patentable subject matter), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 (2009).  Nota-
bly, one judge in Bilski suggested that the oft-quoted statement that patentable sub-
ject matter “include[s] anything under the sun that is made by man,” Chakrabarty, 
447 U.S. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 
(1952)) (internal quotations omitted), was based on a misreading of legislative 
records.  In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1000 (Mayer, J., dissenting). 
 4 See generally Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303. 
 5 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 401–02, 415, 418–19 (2007) (re-
jecting the teaching-suggestion-motivation test as sole way of proving obviousness); 
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128–29, 137 (2007) (holding 
that a licensee of a patent need not breach or terminate license agreement before 
seeking declaratory judgment against licensor); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 
547 U.S. 388, 391–93 (2006) (holding that the traditional four-part test for injunctive 
relief must be satisfied before an injunction is granted and that a finding of in-
fringement alone is insufficient); In re Seagate Tech., L.L.C., 497 F.3d 1360, 1371 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding that willful infringement requires objective reck-
lessness), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1445 (2008). 
 6 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (as passed by House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 
2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. 
(2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 7 Patent (Bryson) Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as amended 
at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006)). 
 8 See infra notes 34–35 and accompanying text. 
 9 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009).  This Comment discusses damages apportionment, 
which is frequently present in Congress’s attempts to reform damages awards.  The 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary retreated from mandatory apportionment in an 
amended version of the 2009 Act, which was introduced to the full Senate in April 
2009.  See S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 34–35 (2009).  The amended bill would allow judges 
flexibility where mandatory apportionment would not because judges would have a 
“gatekeeper” role.  Stephanie Condon, Senate Panel Approves Patent Reform Bill, CNET 
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its mere existence, as well as its detailed provisions, that Congress ap-
preciates the value of intellectual property.  In its various forms, the 
2009 Act comprehensively addresses various reform-centric topics, in-
cluding filing priority,
10
 post-grant procedures,
11
 and remedies, most 
particularly the damages provisions.
12
  The 2009 Act, which is Con-
gress’s fourth attempt at patent reform in recent years,13 ensures that 
patent reform will continue to be a source of lively debate for years to 
come.
14
  The persistence of legislators, lobbyists, and commentators 
alike in discussing the shape and propriety of reform reflects the po-
tentially major effects of legislative change on industry-scale users of 
the patent system. 
In any discussion about patent reform, questions about the 
proper assessment and calculation of patent-infringement damages 
are apt to arise.  The United States Code, which governs patent law 
and procedure, permits damages as one type of remedy for patent in-
fringement.
15
  Generally, a patentee may seek compensatory damages, 
 
NEWS, Apr. 2, 2009, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10210824-38.html (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  While the amended bill is certainly a positive develop-
ment, apportionment is still a part of the recent bill introduced in the House of Rep-
resentatives and repeatedly appeared in earlier reform efforts.  See H.R. 1260 § 5(a); 
see also sources cited infra note 26.  Consequently, for discussion purposes, this 
Comment assumes that Congress will, at some point, legislatively mandate appor-
tionment.  Thus, citations to the Senate bill generally will refer to the version that 
contained mandatory apportionment.  And even if Congress passes a bill without 
mandatory apportionment, the debate over the propriety of the approach would like-
ly continue.  Representatives of several major technology companies expressed ap-
proval of the amendments, but they seemed to expect that more changes would be 
forthcoming.  See Condon, supra. 
 10 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); H.R. 1260 
§ 3. 
 11 S. 610 § 5; S. 515 § 5; H.R. 1260 § 6. 
 12 S. 610 § 4; S. 515 § 4; H.R. 1260 § 5. 
 13 Congress made several attempts that did not become law.  See Patent Reform 
Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong. (2007); Patent 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 
2795, 109th Cong. (2005). 
 14 The House passed its version of the Patent Reform Act of 2007.  See H.R. 1908.  
The Senate version of the 2007 Act, however, stalled in committee after senators dis-
agreed on the method of awarding damages in patent infringement suits.  Andrew 
Noyes, Senators Close to Reintroducing Patent Overhaul Measure, CONGRESSDAILY, Jan. 30, 
2009, http://www.nationaljournal.com/congressdaily/cdp_20090130_2218.php. 
 15 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  Title 35 also permits injunctions as a patent-
infringement remedy.  § 283.  Because the standard for an award of injunctive relief 
for patent infringement has recently become higher and the area remains in flux, see 
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006), injunctions as a pa-
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and the infringer’s gain or loss is not a factor.16  The damages remedy 
is then broken down into two subcategories: lost profits and reasona-
ble royalties.
17
  The second subcategory, reasonable royalties, 
represents the minimum amount of a damages award.
18
 
The case for damages reform in the context of a larger patent-
reform package arises because of a perception that costs—litigation 
costs and high damages awards—are excessive.  In the realm of pa-
tent-infringement lawsuits, a number of parties, including industry 
insiders and legal commentators,
19
 have expressed concern about the 
cost of litigation and the amount of damages awards.
20
  In its most re-
cent attempt to effectuate damages reform, Congress initially pro-
posed statutory damages apportionment in the 2009 Act.
21
  This effort 
 
tent-infringement remedy merits detailed consideration largely beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
 16 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 
1978) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 
(1964)). 
 17 Id. (discussing lost profits); § 284 (discussing reasonable royalties). 
 18 § 284 (stating that upon an infringement judgment, a court must award com-
pensatory damages that are “in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by 
the court”). 
 19 See, e.g., Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 5–8 (statement of Steven R. Appleton); 
see also Coal. for Patent Fairness, Overview, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/ 
about/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2009) (providing that Micron Technology, Inc. is a 
company that belongs to the Coalition for Patent Fairness, a group comprised of 
numerous companies in support of patent reform). 
 20 See, e.g., Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent Trolls: A 
Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
407, 434 (2007) (citing AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N (AIPLA), REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY (2005)) (“Patent litigation is outrageously expensive, driven in 
part by the complexities of the technical and legal issues, uncertainties of claim 
scope, and the amount at stake.”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY: A 
REPORT BY THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ch. 1, at 20 n.135 (2003), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf (noting the argument that 
“money damages have soared . . . both on average and in the highest-visibility cases” 
since the Federal Circuit’s creation (quoting ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, 
PATENT LAW & POLICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 11 (3d ed. 2002))). 
 21 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th 
Cong. (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009).  Senator 
Kyl’s version would not mandate apportionment.  Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 
111th Cong. (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009).  This 
Comment defines apportionment generally as “the requirement that a patentee’s 
recovery be based on the economic value contributed by the patent.”  Eric E. Bensen 
& Danielle M. White, Using Apportionment to Rein in the Georgia-Pacific Factors, 9 COLUM. 
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008), http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=9&article=1 
(citing Eric E. Bensen, Apportionment of Lost Profits in Contemporary Patent Damages Cas-
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mirrors a similar push to implement mandatory apportionment in 
the Patent Reform Act of 2007 (2007 Act),
22
 which would have limited 
courts’ and, consequently, juries’ discretion in reasonable royalty cal-
culations.  Like the 2007 Act,
23
 the 2009 Act addresses an amended 
form of the judicially created “entire market value” rule.24  This rule 
applies when a patentee wants a damages award to incorporate the 
value of a total product, whether or not the patent covers all compo-
nents, and requires that the reason users sought the infringing prod-
uct within the market be the patented component.
25
 
The 2009 Act arrived on the heels of three previous attempts at 
reform.
26
  The fact that Congress included the idea of damages ap-
portionment in each of the previous reform bills indicates that a dis-
cussion of whether apportionment is indeed an appropriate response 
is timely and necessary,
27
 though Congress has begun to recognize the 
divisiveness of the idea.
28
  Although the House of Representatives ver-
sion and the first Senate version of the 2009 Act suggest two other 
methods of calculating a damages award—the entire-market-value 
 
es, 10 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8 (2005), http://www.vjolt.net/vol10/issue3/v10i3_a8-
Bensen.pdf). 
 22 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by 
House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th 
Cong. § 5 (2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007). 
 23 H.R. 1908 § 5; S. 1145 § 5. 
 24 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (adding 35 
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(A)); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) 
(2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(A)).  Senator Kyl’s version does not expressly 
mention the entire-market-value rule.  Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th 
Cong. § 4 (2009).  But Senator Kyl’s version leaves room for its application by per-
mitting consideration of any relevant factors in “determination of the amount of a 
reasonable royalty” though consideration would take place in the context of a hypo-
thetical license negotiation  Id. § 4 (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(b)–(c)). 
 25 Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 26 Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by 
House of Representatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th 
Cong. § 5 (2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007); Patent 
Reform Act of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006) (wherein reasonable-royalty cal-
culations involve consideration of “the economic value that should be attributed to 
the novel and non-obvious feature or features of the invention, as distinguished from 
the economic value attributable to other features”); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 
2795, 109th Cong. § 6 (2005) (stating that a reasonable royalty calculation for com-
bination inventions shall involve consideration of, inter alia, “the portion of the rea-
lizable profit that should be credited to the inventive contribution as distinguished 
from other features of the combination”). 
 27  Id. 
 28  See supra note 9. 
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rule and an “established royalty based on marketplace licensing”29—
apportionment is still the standard under these proposals for “valua-
tion calculation” if the patent owner cannot show either of these two 
methods for calculating a damages award.
30
  Because a patentee will 
not claim the entire market value of a product in every case and be-
cause an established royalty may not exist, apportionment would af-
fect a sizeable number of damages awards if passed into law. 
This Comment asserts that industry-specific patenting needs 
demand retention of a fact-specific judicial approach to calculating 
infringement damages.  Any legislative changes, now or in the future, 
should be minor and must avoid accommodating the requirements of 
one industry over others.  While a certain degree of limitation on 
damages awards may be appropriate in a reform-minded climate, the 
mandatory apportionment method is an ineffective, unfair means of 
accomplishing this end.  Any legislative reform should complement, 
not supersede, the current approach, which relies on courts to calcu-
late damages based on the facts of each case.  This Comment outlines 
how the courts have effectively accomplished this task by accommo-
dating the existing patent laws to the needs of various industries’ in-
ventions.  This Comment also suggests how to preserve the industry-
accommodating approach with legislation that is less divisive than 
apportionment and explains why that course is preferable. 
Legislatively mandated apportionment of damages is not the 
proper approach for controlling damages awards primarily because 
apportionment lends itself more readily to technology-based inven-
tions rather than chemical- or pharmaceutical-based inventions.
31
  In-
deed, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary recognized the impro-
priety of apportionment after numerous meetings with 
representatives of affected industries.
32
  If codified, compulsory ap-
portionment would limit courts’ freedom to fashion remedies that re-
flect the diverse needs of the various industries that use the patent 
system and that invoke the jurisdiction of the court for infringement 
matters.  Mandatory apportionment would replace the time-tested, 
 
 29 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. §§ 284(c)(1)(A)–(B)); Pa-
tent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. §§ 284(c)(1)(A)–(B)). 
 30 S. 515 § 4(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35 
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)). 
 31 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal Protection of 
Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2330 (1994) (“Innovation in software de-
velopment is typically incremental.”); see also infra Parts II.B., III.C. 
 32 See Condon, supra note 9; see also S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 9–10, 34–35 (2009). 
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industry-specific analysis of the patented invention with an inflexible, 
artificial contemplation of “the claimed invention’s specific contribu-
tion over the prior art.”33  If changes to the current approach are ne-
cessary, alternatives to the apportionment scheme exist.  One alterna-
tive involves eliminating the statutory minimum award of a 
reasonable royalty.  This minor change could accompany a statutory-
damages framework borrowed from copyright law but adapted to the 
needs of patentees.  This approach would, to a much greater extent 
than apportionment, ensure a more consistent effect on all industries 
using the patent system. 
To illustrate these principles and suggestions, Part II outlines the 
dimensions of the debate.  Part II.A provides background informa-
tion regarding the foundations and procedure of the U.S. patent sys-
tem.  Part II.B describes relevant characteristics of industry-scale users 
of the patent system, the goals of those users, and the factors converg-
ing to prompt reform.  Part III examines current statutes that minim-
ize or obviate the need for additional reform, assesses current patent-
infringement-damages jurisprudence, and suggests that formal, statu-
tory deviation from this jurisprudence is unnecessary.  This Part also 
considers the impact of mandatory damages apportionment on the 
various industries that use the patent system and provides normative 
reasons why this course is unfavorable.  Part IV introduces viable al-
ternatives to apportionment as a means of addressing concerns about 
the patent system.  These alternatives complement the current judi-
cial approach and include elimination of the reasonable-royalty floor 
and imposition of a statutory-damages regime.  In Part V, this Com-
ment concludes by suggesting that, instead of attempting to assuage 
the unilateral concerns of large technology companies by mandating 
damages apportionment, Congress should continue to permit the 
courts to craft invention- and industry-specific solutions to problems 
that arise on a case-by-case basis.  Continued industry-specific juri-
sprudence and modest legislative enactments will address the patent-
ing needs of all users without favoring large technology companies at 
the expense of the pharmaceutical industry. 
  
 
 33 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)). 
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM AND  
ITS INDUSTRY-SCALE USERS 
A. The Basic Structure of United States Patent Law and its Damages 
Provisions 
The United States patent system is a massive force with humble 
beginnings.  The system wields enormous economic power and is 
monetarily immense—”valued at more than $5 trillion”34 by one es-
timate.  It also has major trade value for the United States.
35
  This im-
portant intellectual-property system derives from a simple constitu-
tional grant of power to Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Disco-
veries.”36  Congress capitalized on its power by permitting inventors to 
obtain patents on their creations so long as their patent applications 
satisfy the remaining Title 35 requirements.
37
 
The patent system operates on a give-and-take principle.  Under-
lying the system is a goal of encouraging and rewarding progress in 
research and development by bestowing upon inventors a time-
limited, exclusive right of use and ownership of their inventions.
38
  In 
exchange, the public receives a benefit in the form of an invention 
disclosure, as well as access to the claimed technology when the pa-
tent terminates.
39
  This idea of an exchange has long been present in 
patent jurisprudence.
40
  For example, the Supreme Court indicated 
nearly two centuries ago that if the invention before the Court was al-
ready in the public domain or in the public’s “possession,” granting a 
patent on the invention would provide “no quid pro quo—no price 
 
 34 Letter from Nathaniel F. Wienecke, Assistant Sec’y for Legislative and Intergo-
vernmental Affairs, to Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary (Feb. 4, 
2008), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/110/ 
S1145020408.pdf. 
 35 See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (7th ed. 2006) (“The transfer of in-
formation has become an ever greater component of international trade and is the 
centerpiece of U.S. competitiveness.  Unlike other sectors of the economy, in the 
area of intellectual property the United States is a net exporter—indeed, the world’s 
larger exporter by far.”). 
 36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 37 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (permitting the inventor of “any new and useful 
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof” to acquire a patent on it “subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title”). 
 38 S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 2 (2008). 
 39 Id. 
 40 See generally Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829). 
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for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor” for 
the patent term.
41
 
As with other property rights, the patent monopoly connotes a 
negative right.  Patents do not confer an affirmative right to practice 
the invention; they provide only a right to exclude others from doing 
so.
42
  The written patent document contains one or more claims, 
which are carefully crafted sentences at the end of a patent document 
that define the “metes and bounds of the patentee’s right to ex-
clude.”43  When an entity “makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells” an in-
vention that embodies everything claimed in a patent without the 
permission of the patentee, that entity infringes the patent.
44
  Even if 
the actor does not personally perform every step of the claim, the ac-
tor may be liable for active inducement of infringement or contribu-
tory infringement
45
 as long as some entity somewhere is directly in-
fringing the patent.
46
 
After a court decides that a defendant infringed a patent, the 
damages provisions enter the picture.
47
  Section 284 of Title 35 
“paints the criteria for the fixing of damages in broad strokes,” pro-
vided, however, that the awarded amount is at least a reasonable 
royalty.
48
  Currently, courts may consider a multitude of factors and 
 
 41 Id. at 23. 
 42 The patent law, under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1), reads as follows: 
Contents. Every patent shall contain a short title of the invention and a 
grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, of the right to exclude oth-
ers from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention 
throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of the right to exclude 
others from using, offering for sale or selling throughout the United 
States, or importing into the United States, products made by that 
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof. 
Id. 
 43 F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 90 (4th 
ed. 2008). 
 44 § 271(a). 
 45 Id. § 271(b)–(c). 
 46 See, e.g., Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 341–
42 (1961) (stating that “there can be no contributory infringement” without direct 
infringement); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 911 F.2d 670, 
673 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners Unlimited., Inc., 803 F.2d 
684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Standard Oil Co. v. Nippon Shokubai Kagaku Kogyo Co., 
754 F.2d 345, 348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Aro Mfg. Co., 365 U.S. at 341) (stating that “a 
finding of induced or contributory infringement must be predicated on a direct in-
fringement”). 
 47 § 284. 
 48 England v. Deere & Co., 221 F. Supp. 319, 322 (S.D. Ill. 1963). 
WIGGINS (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 3/15/2010  12:39 PM 
282 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40:273 
elements as each case warrants.
49
  Two primary types of judicially 
created damages awards have emerged in response to the liberal sta-
tutory framework for infringement damages.  The first is the lost-
profits measure, which depends on the patentee’s profits, ignores the 
alleged infringer’s profits, and examines “(1) demand for the pa-
tented product, (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes, 
(3) [the patentee’s] manufacturing and marketing capability to ex-
ploit the demand, and (4) the amount of the profit [the patentee] 
would have made.”50 
Where unable to prove actual damages for calculation of lost 
profits, the plaintiff’s second option is to seek reasonable royalties.51  
“A reasonable royalty is [the] amount” that a person who wants to use 
the patented invention “would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet 
be able to make and sell the patented article, in the market, at a rea-
sonable profit.”52  Typically, the operative calculus entails considera-
tion of factors that “prudent businessmen” would consider in struc-
turing a “hypothetical license” involving the patented invention.53  
Interestingly, one factor explores “[t]he utility and advantages of the 
patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had been 
used for working out similar results.”54  Another factor is expert tes-
timony,
55
 common in the reasonable-royalty calculus.  Traditionally, 
reasonable royalties were the exceptional measure of damages while 
lost profits were the mainstay.
56
  But reasonable royalties may have 
overcome lost profits as the most common form of damages award 
for infringement.
57
  This possibility underscores the significance of 
legislative reform that aims to change the way reasonable royalties are 
calculated. 
Under either a lost-profits or a reasonable-royalty calculation, a 
patentee can seek damages in the amount of the entire market value 
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 
1978). 
 51 Id. at 1157. 
 52 Id. at 1157–58 (quoting Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire 
Co., 95 F.2d 978, 984 (6th Cir. 1937)). 
 53 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120–1121 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
 54 Id. at 1120. 
 55 Id. 
 56 See S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 11 & n.42 (2008). 
 57 Id. at 11 n.42. 
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of the infringing product or process.
58
  In entire-market-value analy-
sis, a patentee suing for infringement on a product embodying his 
claimed invention, along with unpatented components, must show 
that the components or elements covered by the patent were the “ba-
sis for customer demand” of the purportedly infringing product.59  In 
the absence of such a showing, the patentee’s infringement recovery 
is proportionately lower. 
B. The Characteristics, Goals, and Reform Perspectives of Industry-
Scale Users of the Patent System 
Many diverse industries utilize the patent system.  Two of the 
most prominent industries are, first, the “Big Pharma sector,”60 which 
for the purposes of this Comment encompasses major pharmaceuti-
cal, biological, and chemical companies, and, second, the “Big Tech 
industries,”61 which include computer, software, and high-technology 
entities.  The companies in these two industries respectively produce 
dissimilar inventions and have different reasons for using the patent 
system.
62
  As a result, their interests place them on opposite sides of a 
debate over patent reform,
63
 with technology companies advocating 
for legislative limitations on damages awards and pharmaceutical 
companies suggesting that limitations would be superfluous.  This 
Part provides a generalized sketch of the industries’ relevant charac-
teristics.  
The science-based, specifically pharmaceutical, disciplines are 
generally pro-patent, given the nature of the typical invention and 
the long journey to the market.  A representative invention of the 
chemical or pharmaceutical industry might be a pharmaceutical 
drug, a genetic or proteomic fragment, or other chemical composi-
tion, and research tends to be cumulative rather than incremental.
64
  
 
 58 See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc); State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
 59 Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1549 (quoting State Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d at 1580; 
TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895, 900–01 (Fed. Cir. 1986)) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 60 Clarisa Long, Our Uniform Patent System, 55 FED. LAW. 44, 45 (2008) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 61 Id. at 44–46 (internal quotation marks omitted).  These companies, such as 
“Microsoft, Apple, Google, and Cisco,” support the proposed reform.  Id. at 47. 
 62 See, e.g., Editorial, Patently Ridiculous, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2006, at A24. 
 63 Long, supra note 60, at 45. 
 64 See Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Invention in the Biopharmaceutical Industry: 
The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 813, 815–16 (2001).  There 
may be some incremental invention in the pharmaceutical realm, but the benefits 
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Major pharmaceutical companies are usually infringement plaintiffs 
and often sue generic-drug makers.
65
  Some commentators suggest 
that pharmaceutical patents are “more frequently litigated than pa-
tents in other industries and are often for entirely new products.”66  
Additionally, the pharmaceutical industry needs a highly effective pa-
tent system,
67
 as pharmaceutical inventions often take years and a 
great deal of capital to develop.
68
  The patent system may even be es-
sential to the continued vitality of major pharmaceutical companies’ 
research and development structure,
69
 which emphasizes patents as a 
return on the research investment.
70
  Often, businesses and investors 
need an incentive to undertake and fund scientific research,
71
 and pa-
tent law provides an opportunity for that incentive.  Patents can pro-
vide a source of revenue through licensing or damages awards against 
infringers. 
The features of the large technology companies supporting 
damages reform are very different from those of the pharmaceutical 
industry.  The technology-based invention may be “incremental,”72 
and inventions tend to be “new features and enhancements to exist-
ing products.”73  Because technological innovation tends to be incre-
mental, a company might need access to a tremendous number of pa-
 
appear less certain and “discrete innovation” seems to be dominant.  See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 3, at 4–9, 14.  Certainly, the types of inventions in the 
pharmaceutical and technological industries may overlap to some extent, but broad 
generalizations are drawn here to outline the boundaries of the patent reform de-
bate. 
 65 Eric E. Williams, Note, Patent Reform: The Pharmaceutical Industry Prescription for 
Post-Grant Opposition and Remedies, 90 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 354, 364–65 
(2008). 
 66 John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United States Pa-
tent System, 82 B.U. L. REV. 77, 137 (2002). 
 67 John Markoff, Two Views of Innovation Colliding in Washington, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
13, 2008, § 3, at 3. 
 68 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Jeff Gerth, In a Drug’s Journey to Market, Discovery is 
Just the First of Many Steps, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2000, § 1, at 15. 
 69 Long, supra note 60, at 45 (“Pharmaceutical research is a high-cost, highly un-
certain process, with a final product that is cheap to reverse engineer, copy, and mass 
produce.”); see also Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 6 (statement of Philip S. Johnson). 
 70 See Stolberg & Gerth, supra note 68; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, 
ch.2, at 1; ch. 3, at 1, 4–9, 14. 
 71 Matthew T. Latimer, Patenting Inventions Arising from Biological Research, 6 
GENOME BIOLOGY 203.1, 203.2–.3 (2004), available at http://genomebiology.com/ 
2004/6/1/203. 
 72 Samuelson et al., supra note 31, at 2330; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 
20, Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 2, at 25–26. 
 73 Eric E. Bensen, Commentary, Patent Reform Act of 2007, 2008 EMERGING ISSUES 
529, at 5. 
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tented products for the creation of just one product.
74
  If a patentee 
sues the company for infringement on the basis of that one product, 
the allegedly infringed patent may relate to a minor aspect of the de-
vice.
75
  The holder of a patent purportedly covering that minor part 
of the product can effectively force the technology company to pay 
any demanded royalty by holding “hostage” the production of the 
device with infringement charges.
76
  As a result, technology compa-
nies are “increasingly finding that the nation’s patent system has be-
come a minefield,” and these companies want to “limit the leverage” 
of independent patent-holding inventors and patent trolls.
77
  The 
companies may therefore seek broad patent protection on as much as 
they can to avoid possible infringement or licensing fees at a later 
date.  This tactic, known as defensive patenting,
78
 tends to create a 
“patent thicket,”79 which may function as an obstacle to innovation.80 
For the major market players in the technology sector, the pa-
tent system may hamper, rather than spur, innovation.  Many big 
technology companies may dismiss the patent system as overly con-
strictive because the companies instead can emphasize, for example, 
“market power and cross-licensing relationships” to advance devel-
opment.
81
  Cross-licensing power provides companies an alternative 
means of invention valuation.
82
  The importance of licensing as an in-
centive also undermines the notion that litigation is too common in 
the large technology sector.  Indeed, despite the fierce push for 
 
 74  See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 3, at 30. 
 75 Long, supra note 60, at 45. 
 76 Id. at 46. 
 77 Markoff, supra note 67, § 3, at 3.  For a discussion of “patent trolls,” see infra 
notes 98–109 and accompanying text. 
 78 See, e.g., Bensen, supra note 73, at 5; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, 
Executive Summary, at 6; ch. 2, at 26. 
 79 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 6 & n.20 (describing 
a patent thicket as a “dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that a 
company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technol-
ogy” (quoting Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket: Cross Licenses, Patent Pools, 
and Standard-Setting, in 1 INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 119, 120 (Adam Jaffe 
et al. eds., 2001))). 
 80 Id. at 6–7. 
 81 Markoff, supra note 67, § 3, at 3; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 
2, at 2 (suggesting the decreased importance of patents in “the semiconductor and 
communications industries”). 
 82 Long, supra note 60, at 45 (“Many technological sectors do not primarily rely 
on patents in order to capture the value of their inventions.  Instead, they use patents 
defensively or as assets to bring to the table in a cross-licensing negotiation.”); see also 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 3, at 32–33 (discussing trade secrecy); ch. 3, at 
31, 43, 44, 46, 56 (noting the role of competition).  
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reform deriving from the technology sector,
83
 empirical research sug-
gests that litigation is actually less frequent in technology-focused in-
dustries, where “royalty-free cross-licensing” is quite common.84 
For technology companies already uncomfortable with the pa-
tent system’s constraints, the relative ambiguity of the current dam-
ages provision is an additional problem that needs to be addressed in 
legislative reform.  The current statute leaves the standards for a rea-
sonable royalty to the courts, as they are not specified in the law it-
self.
85
  Technology companies claim that this framework leads to ex-
orbitant damage awards.
86
 
As may be evident from the above discussion, the divergent 
perspectives of pharmaceutical and large technology companies on 
the utility of patent protection lead to opposing views on the need for 
reform and on what shape such reform should take.  Some suggest 
that patent reform incorporating damages apportionment favors ma-
jor technology-based industries and their representative inventions.
87
  
According to some commentators, patent reform addresses the com-
plaints of “large information technology . . . companies seeking to 
reduce their exposure to patent trolls.”88  While mandatory appor-
 
 83 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  Because empirical research seems to 
favor both sides of this debate, this Comment assumes for the sake of argument that 
technology companies do indeed face obstacles meriting a discussion of reform. 
 84 Allison & Lemley, supra note 66, at 140 (identifying specifically the “semicon-
ductor and electronics industries”). 
 85 See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform 2009: Damages, 
PATENTLY-O, Mar. 3 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-
reform-2009-damages.html (“The current damages statute gives little guidance to a 
court.”). 
 86 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 87 See, e.g., Long, supra note 60, at 46–47; see also Dennis Crouch, Patent Reform Act 
of 2009, PATENTLY-O, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/ 
patent-reform-act-of-2009.html (stating that “it is clear that this is not ‘balanced’ 
reform” and that the damages changes will likely “reduce patent awards”). 
 88 Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent Trolls: The Divergent 
Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 689, 692 (2006).  As a counter-
part to these technology companies, the author cites the opposition to reform 
lodged by “[l]arge biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies” that do 
not encounter patent troll problems as frequently.  Id. at 693; see also Markoff, supra 
note 67 (“It appears that the Senate leadership has sympathy for the large technolo-
gy companies.”).  Research indicates, however, that the large damages awards with 
which technology companies take issue may be less problematic than the industry 
suggests.  See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An 
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 237, 278 (2006) (suggesting that a relatively small number of infringement ver-
dicts result and with correspondingly few damage awards); see also David W. Opder-
beck, Patent Damages and the Shape of Patent Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 127, 137–50 (2009) 
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tionment may improve the technology industry’s litigation position, 
pharmaceutical companies could often find themselves in a compara-
tively disadvantageous situation, whether they are plaintiffs or defen-
dants in an infringement suit.  Whereas a technological invention 
might contribute to the existing art because, for example, a computer 
component increases memory by a certain tangible percentage or 
processing speed by some calculable margin, a pharmaceutical or 
chemical invention may not offer any immediately measurable im-
provement in patient outcomes. 
Given these differences, it would be much easier to conduct ap-
portionment within infringement suits involving technology patents 
because the “specific contribution over the prior art”89 could, in many 
instances, be empirically determinable.  Relative ease of computation 
could be extraordinarily important in the damages phase of patent 
litigation, where a lay jury is deciding on an amount to award a paten-
tee.  In contrast, the pharmaceutical or chemical invention’s benefit 
may be intangible, or alternatively, may not be fully evident at the 
moment of the invention but could culminate later in an important 
medical or clinical discovery.
90
  Apportionment ignores the multitude 
of possibilities for pharmaceutical inventions by suggesting a “back-
wards-looking” stance,91 where a “forward looking view” would more 
readily accommodate these characteristics.
92
 
The difference in the timing and tangibility of benefits is not the 
only basis for contrast between pharmaceutical and technological in-
ventions.  If a juror can conceptually break an invention down into its 
component parts, then the invention lends itself well to apportion-
ment of damages.  In effect, a juror may find it easier to affix a value 
to parts that can actually be separated than to parts that form a cohe-
sive whole.  Technology-based inventions are, as a general matter, 
more amenable to theoretical division into discrete components than 
are pharmaceutical- or chemical-based inventions.  For example, one 
commentator discussed a computer-aided method that requires input 
 
(collecting and analyzing the results of previous statistical damages awards studies, 
conducting an original study, and concluding that no trend toward excessive damag-
es emerges). 
 89 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th 
Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009). 
 90 See Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 167 (indicating that the contribution of a dis-
covery or invention over prior art may be modest at the time of discovery but could 
result in a drastic difference years later). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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of genes to assess lifestyle-risk factors.
93
  The degree of the method’s 
utility depends on the number of gene fragments the program can 
access and on the particular function each gene performs.
94
  Presum-
ably, the biological significance of the encoded protein determines 
the program’s ultimate usefulness and success.95  Changing the facts 
for the moment to imagine that this invention was an actual, physical 
computer, rather than an algorithm, provides an interesting scenario 
for examining the differences between technological and biological 
or pharmaceutical inventions. 
Potential infringement issues related to the hypothetical com-
puter illustrate the nature of technological inventions as generally di-
visible and of scientific inventions as frequently cohesive or indivisi-
ble.  If the patent at issue in an infringement suit involving a 
computer-covered monitor with increased pixel density, market stu-
dies and statistical analysis could help pinpoint the new feature at-
tracting the customer to the product.  In this way, the claimed inven-
tion’s “specific contribution over the prior art” could be 
determined.
96
  The situation would be very different if the patent de-
scribed a gene fragment that codes for the first ten amino acids of a 
protein linked to a particular medical condition.
97
  If the allegedly in-
fringing product included a gene fragment coding for the second ten 
amino acids of the same protein, market studies or statistical analysis 
would not assist in isolating the protein’s consumer-attractive feature.  
No rational way is available to determine whether the purportedly in-
fringed patent improved over existing art and to what, if any, degree. 
In their push for damages reform, large technology companies 
often cite a “significant cottage industry” of non-manufacturing and 
non-practicing entities purchasing patents and asserting the inherent 
 
 93 See David Castle, Intellectual Property and Nutrigenomics, 16 HEALTH L. REV. 58, 60 
(2008), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb1366/is_3_16/ 
ai_n29427283/pg_1?tag=artBody;col1. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See id. 
 96 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)). 
 97 Proteins carry out numerous vital processes in organisms, such as catalyzing 
biological reactions and carrying out molecular transport.  See JEREMY M. BERG ET AL., 
BIOCHEMISTRY 41–42 (5th ed. 2002).  Proteins are built from various compositions of 
amino acids, and in turn, genes determine the amino acid sequences.  Id. at 43–53.  
It follows that, while amino acids are individually important, the entirety of the 
grouping determines the function of the protein. 
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rights.
98
  The entities often work with patents whose inventors or as-
signees would not or could not practice the claimed invention.
99
  
They are dubbed “patent trolls” and exist solely to enforce otherwise 
insignificant patents and patents of questionable validity.
100
  Thus, pa-
tent trolls artificially increase transaction and litigation costs for both 
users and non-users of the patent system. 
The profile of patent trolls arose in recent years after protracted 
litigation involving Research in Motion, the maker of BlackBerry de-
vices.
101
  A patent-holding company, NTP, sued Research in Motion 
for infringing patents that covered parts of the e-mail technology that 
Research in Motion purportedly used in BlackBerry devices.
102
  A jury 
found that Research in Motion had infringed the patents, and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit partially affirmed the 
infringement verdict.
103
  The parties continued negotiations and 
eventually settled,
104
 as NTP possibly could have obtained an injunc-
tion against all distribution and use of BlackBerry products after the 
infringement verdict in its favor.  Given the incremental nature of 
technology patents, situations such as the one in the BlackBerry case 
can arise whereby a non-practicing entity can threaten to shut down 
an entire system based on an allegedly infringed patent covering only 
a minor aspect of the overall product.
105
  Even where the litigation 
ends in a settlement, rather than a damages award, the settlement 
amount can be massive.
106
  Large technology companies with success-
ful but intricate products observe these types of cases and demand 
patent reform in general and apportionment in particular. 
 
 98 Harkins, supra note 20, at 410. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Id. at 410–11 (citing Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2006, at 51, 
53; Raymond P. Niro & Paul K. Vickrey, The Patent Troll Myth, 7 SEDONA CONF. J. 153, 
153 (2006)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 101 NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 102 Id. at 1290. 
 103 Id. at 1291–92, 1325–26; see also Matthew J. May, Comment, Patent Reform, In-
junctions, and Equitable Principles: A Triangle of Changes for the Future, 6 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 671, 676 (2007). 
 104 May, supra note 103, at 676. 
 105 This idea of product holdup underlies the technology industry’s concerns.  See, 
e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, Executive Summary, at 7 (stating that a 
“questionable patent . . . may be asserted to hold up production of [an] entire soft-
ware program”). 
 106 See Ian Austen, BlackBerry Service to Continue, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at C1.  
The case was settled for $612.5 million.  Id. 
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While many commentators have lamented the role of patent 
trolls, others have argued that they serve a useful function.  These 
“patent dealers” may act “as a market intermediary in the patent 
market” and thereby provide “liquidity, market clearing, and in-
creased efficiency to the patent markets.”107  Regardless of which view 
is proper, noting that entities are technically completely within their 
rights under the patent laws to purchase patents and enforce them 
without ever practicing the invention is important.
108
  Any reforms 
that purport to target non-practicing entities must be sensitive not 
only to their potentially beneficial purposes but also to the fact that 
they are within the letter of the law regarding patent protection.
109
  
Apportionment of damages may be one way to target the economic 
incentives behind the much-maligned patent troll issue, but given the 
negative consequences on other industries, apportionment cannot be 
the best or only solution. 
The tension between pharmaceutical and technology companies 
resulting from their differing uses of patenting,
110
 the perceived 
threat of increasing damage awards and patent trolls,
111
 and congres-
sional recognition of these converging factors have culminated in 
several recent legislative proposals for patent reform, including the 
notion of damages apportionment.
112
  The legislation will not likely 
 
 107 James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative 
View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190, 201 
(2006) (referencing DAVID L. SCOTT, WALL STREET WORDS: AN A TO Z GUIDE TO 
INVESTMENT TERMS FOR TODAY’S INVESTOR 87 (3d ed. 2003)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  The author’s thesis, at least in part, rests on the idea that small-
entity or individual inventors do not have the capital to force litigation and thus can-
not effectively enforce their patents.  Id. at 210.  Non-practicing entities, whether 
deemed trolls or dealers, have more financial liquidity with which to fund a lawsuit, 
which would theoretically prompt more licensing by potential infringers in lieu of an 
approach that involves infringing the patent and handling litigation if it arises.  See 
id. at 210–11. 
 108 See Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 348, 403 n.12 
(D. Del. 2002), injunction modified, 235 F. Supp. 2d 370 (D. Del. 2002), aff’d, 56 Fed. 
Appx. 503 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (stating that “a patentee need not commercialize his in-
vention to successfully sue for patent infringement, and . . . a patent at its core is the 
right to exclude”). 
 109 The issue of the utility vel non of non-practicing, patent-holding entities, or 
patent trolls, is a broad one.  The dimensions of the problem are outlined merely to 
illustrate one of the industry-specific factors prompting patent reform and to indi-
cate how alleviating this problem accords with the proposed reform alternatives em-
bodied herein. 
 110 See supra notes 60–86 and accompanying text. 
 111 See Harkins, supra note 20; see also supra notes 98–109 and accompanying text. 
 112 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred 
to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Pa-
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bring this heated debate to an end.  Regardless of whether damages 
apportionment becomes law (in this or a future round of patent 
reform legislation), pharmaceutical-minded and large technology-
focused companies will continue to have vastly different uses and 
goals for the patent system.  The patent system needs a measured leg-
islative approach that keeps flexible jurisprudence intact while rea-
sonably addressing the needs of the technology sector.  This result 
will preserve the value of the system as a whole through that indus-
try’s continued use without significantly altering the necessary incen-
tives for pharmaceutical companies. 
III. OPERATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, CURRENT DAMAGES 
JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF REFORM UPON 
PATENT SYSTEM USERS 
A.  Statutory Provisions Negating the Need for Legislatively Mandated 
Damages Apportionment 
Current patent law is sufficiently flexible to provide the result 
that large technology companies seek.  The law already addresses, in 
a technology-neutral way and during the examination phase,
113
 the 
need for claimed inventions to be different from and perhaps even 
better than prior art.  Thus, additional checks at the damages phase 
are superfluous.
114
  For example, the nonobviousness requirement for 
obtaining a patent mandates consideration of the claimed invention 
in light of the existing art in the relevant subject area.
115
  The inven-
tion must satisfy a standard of being different from what others have 
 
tent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent 
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 5 (2007) (as passed by House of Rep-
resentatives, Sept. 7, 2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 5 
(2007) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Apr. 18, 2007); Patent Reform Act 
of 2006, S. 3818, 109th Cong. § 5 (2006); Patent Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 
109th Cong. § 6 (2005). 
 113 A patent is a government-granted privilege, and the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office scrutinizes each patent application, a process called examination, 
for compliance with the applicable statutory requirements.  See KIEFF ET AL., supra 
note 43, at 72. 
 114 This additional check would be the “specific contribution over the prior art” 
language in certain versions of the 2009 Act or similar wording effectively mandating 
damages apportionment.  See, e.g., H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 
284(c)(1)(C)). 
 115 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3 (1966); 
infra notes 155–64 and accompanying text. 
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done previously to receive the benefit of the patent monopoly.
116
  The 
relevance of provisions such as 35 U.S.C. § 103 lies not only in ensur-
ing thorough consideration of a claimed invention against what al-
ready exists in the field, but in carrying out this analysis long before 
questions of infringement and damages arise.  When the Patent and 
Trademark Office issues a patent, it has already given its stamp of ap-
proval that the claimed invention has made a contribution over the 
prior art in a given field because the invention would not be obvious 
to one of ordinary skill in that art.
117
 
The utility requirement is another example of how current pa-
tent statutes already incorporate the result for which large technology 
companies advocate.  If a patent is granted, the United States Patent 
and Trademark Office has determined that the invention satisfies a 
major patentability requirement in 35 U.S.C. § 101, which permits an 
applicant to obtain a patent only on a “new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful 
improvement thereof.”118  From the statutory language of “useful,”119 
courts have derived a theme of “technological benefit.”120  This bene-
fit has to “exist[] in [a] currently available form.”121  While one read-
ing of these decisions suggests that the courts simply meant to pre-
vent patents on impossible inventions,
122
 another interpretation posits 
that the utility requirement is not met if the public does not receive 
an actual benefit from an invention.
123
  If the pertinent field of art is 
 
 116 The particular formulation of the obviousness rule of law has changed in im-
portant ways over the life of the patent system.  See infra notes 154–64 and accompa-
nying text.  But a lasting statement of the rule is found in Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
 117 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006). 
 118 § 101. 
 119 Id. 
 120 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 35, at 7 (discussing differences between copyright law 
and patent law). 
 121 Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966); see also In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 
1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding that a claimed invention has to have a “signifi-
cant and presently available benefit to the public” and a “well-defined and particular 
benefit to the public”). 
 122 See, e.g., In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 863–64 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (af-
firming that cold fusion does not satisfy the utility requirement). 
 123 See, e.g., Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (“‘Practical utility’ 
is a shorthand way of attributing ‘real-world’ value to claimed subject matter.  In oth-
er words, one skilled in the art can use a claimed discovery in a manner which pro-
vides some immediate benefit to the public.”).  Although the Nelson case decided an 
interference appeal, id. at 854–55, the court’s rationale can be logically applied in 
the context of this discussion.  Indeed, this interpretation of the utility requirement 
dates back more than a century.  See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740 (stating that, 
for an invention to be patentable, it need not only “be bestowed upon the public by 
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crowded and a consumer could simply use another product or com-
ponent that works in essentially the same way, an invention has not 
bestowed a benefit on that consumer.  The consumer may have addi-
tional choices but no new benefit in a technological sense.
124
 
Under this reading of the statute and interpretive case law, the 
utility requirement functions as an examination-stage screening me-
chanism that allows inventions to be patented only if they have con-
tributed a benefit to the existing subject matter.  Even under the nar-
rower reading of the utility requirement, in which an invention does 
not have to explicitly improve on the existing art to be patentable 
and an inventor is “rewarded for disclosing something new,”125 if not 
necessarily better, the provision still permits consideration of benefits 
long before the damages phase.  If the patent system does not render 
a dispositive judgment about benefits to the public, members of the 
latter group will decide on their own.
126
  Regardless of whether the 
patent examining system or the general public rules on an inven-
tion’s beneficial utility, the damages provisions ideally play no impor-
tant role in the decision. 
The nonobviousness and utility requirements suggest that all in-
ventions, whether pharmaceutical or technological, must add some-
thing to the art or at least provide something different from what al-
ready exists.  If an invention fails to reach this threshold, it cannot 
attain the rights and privileges associated with a patent.  Because sta-
tutory mechanisms that address the concerns of major technology 
companies already exist, Congress need not add an additional re-
quirement of the same character in the damages section of Title 35.  
The nonobviousness and utility provisions already establish a statuto-
ry framework that allows, initially, the patent office to screen inven-
 
its inventor” but also must “confer on [the public] a benefit” (quoting 1 WILLIAM 
ROBINSON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS 462–63 (1890))). 
 124 The consumer may benefit from a lower price by virtue of greater competition, 
but such issues are more properly the province of antitrust law.  Additionally, the 
proposed damages provisions would consider the availability of “similar noninfring-
ing substitutes in the relevant market” that have been “the subject of . . . nonexclu-
sive licenses” in determining whether a particular established royalty amount is ap-
plicable to the determination of a damages award.  See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 
515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 
2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(B)); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260 § 
5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 
U.S.C. § 284 (c)(1)(B)).  This language is superfluous, however, because that process 
is already judicially ingrained.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 125 Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 166. 
 126 Id. (citing Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817) (No. 
8568)). 
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tions for benefits and, subsequently, the courts to fashion appropriate 
remedies for the specific inventions in suit, regardless of technologi-
cal pedigree. 
B.  Patent Jurisprudence: Effective in its Current State 
When calculating infringement damages, courts presently have 
the freedom to consider the particular characteristics of the patented 
invention, whether the invention is classified as pharmaceutical, bio-
logical, chemical, technological, mechanical, or otherwise.
127
  With 
the capacity to be flexible under the current damages statute,
128
 
courts can accommodate the needs of the industries and have often 
done so.  The Federal Circuit has recognized that a damages calcula-
tion is hardly a one-size-fits-all endeavor, even within industries,
129
 and 
that classes of inventions require special treatment in other ways.  For 
example, the Federal Circuit can and does uniquely apply particular 
statutory requirements, such as the utility requirement and the best-
mode requirement,
130
 for obtaining patents in different ways for dif-
ferent types of inventions.  It is especially compelling that statistical 
evidence may support the notion of “courts . . . deciding cases indivi-
dually on the merits.”131 
Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co.
132
 highlights one situation 
in which a general patenting principle was adapted to meet the de-
mands of the specific chemical invention in suit.
133
  The case involved 
erythropoietin (EPO), a protein that is used to “stimulate[] the pro-
 
 127 The courts currently possess this broad discretion because the statute compel-
ling an award of damages for patent infringement does not single out, expressly or by 
implication, any type of invention.  See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 128 Id. 
 129 See, e.g., Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(“We have never held that any one profit accounting methodology is appropriate in 
all industries, for all companies, in all cases.  The selection of the appropriate me-
thod of profit accounting in the circumstances is properly left to the broad discretion 
of the district court.”), mandate recalled and remanded with instructions to District Court on 
allowance of interest, 557 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2009); see also id. at 1366 (“The correct 
measure of damages is a highly case-specific and fact-specific analysis.”). 
 130 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2006); see Northern Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 
215 F.3d 1281, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that, in a case involving a treatment for 
semiconductors, whether the best-mode requirement is satisfied depends on the 
threshold question of the “defin[ition] [of] the invention at hand”).  See generally In 
re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (imposing an industry-specific standard for 
utility requirement’s application to chemical inventions). 
 131 Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 137. 
 132 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 133 Id. 
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duction of red blood cells” and that is useful in treating blood dis-
orders, including anemia.
134
  Whereas the preparation of the protein 
historically relied on purification from human urine, a technique 
eliminating this need was developed in the form of EPO produced 
from recombinant DNA containing the gene encoding the EPO pro-
tein.
135
  The recombinant DNA is used in conjunction with cell cul-
tures “containing the EPO gene.”136  Amgen obtained a patent on the 
isolated EPO-coding DNA sequences and accompanying host cells.
137
  
The defendant in Amgen, Genetics Institute, owned another patent 
with similar subject matter that claimed, inter alia, “homogenous EPO 
and compositions thereof.”138  Amgen sued Genetics Institute and 
Chugai for alleged infringement of the Amgen patent based partly on 
the defendants’ use of recombinant DNA and vector-containing host 
cells.
139
  Invalidity issues arose as to several of the patents in suit and 
required determination of which inventor first conceived the inven-
tion.
140
  After stating the general test for conception—that it “requires 
both the idea of the invention’s structure and possession of an opera-
tive method of making it”141—the court recognized a more specific 
 
 134 Id. at 1203. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. at 1203–04. 
 138 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1203. 
 139 Id. at 1204.  Chugai is named in the suit because it is the exclusive licensee of 
this Genetics Institute patent.  See Amgen Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 
(BNA) 1737, 1738 (D. Mass. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, vacated in part, Amgen, 
927 F.2d 1200. 
 140 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1204–07.  The conception date is important because under 
35 U.S.C. § 102(g), a person can obtain a patent on an invention, assuming that all 
other patentability requirements are met, only if that invention was not already done 
before by someone else; therefore, inventors trying to obtain a patent or to prove in 
an infringement suit that their invention came first will try to push back the inven-
tion date as much as possible.  See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2006).  That antedating is 
made possible by the following provision: 
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless – 
. . . . 
(g)(2) before such person’s invention thereof, the invention was made 
in this country by another inventor who had not abandoned, sup-
pressed or concealed it. In determining priority of invention under this 
subsection, there shall be considered not only the respective dates of 
conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the 
reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce 
to practice, from a time prior to conception by the other. 
Id. 
 141 Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1206 (citing Oka v. Youssefyeh, 849 F.2d 581, 583 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)). 
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test for chemical compounds.  According to the court, a gene quali-
fies as a chemical compound, and conception of that gene involves 
the inventor being able to define the compound “so as to distinguish 
it from other materials, and to describe how to obtain it.”142  If an in-
ventor cannot “envision the detailed constitution of a gene so as to 
distinguish it from other materials, as well as a method for obtaining 
it,” conception only occurs upon reduction to practice.143  The court’s 
test is flexible enough to permit recognition, in other cases and with 
regard to other inventions, of the difference between isolating a 
compound and creating or assembling the compound as in mechani-
cal inventions.
144
  Given the court’s careful and technology-specific 
analysis in Amgen,
145
 courts can reasonably and, in fact, do capably ad-
dress unique industry needs in the context of damages calculations. 
Importantly, courts have already incorporated the principle un-
derlying the proposed apportionment approach where appropriate.  
Legislatively mandated apportionment becomes unnecessary as a re-
sult.  For example, in claim construction, a broader claim scope may 
be afforded to “pioneering inventions,”146 apparently because of an 
absence of limiting prior art.  By implication, an invention that adds 
little to a field will have a smaller range of equivalents and corres-
pondingly smaller claim scope.
147
  Thus, the court will consider any 
conceivable contribution to the art in determining the range of equi-
valents and whether infringement occurred at all.  If a court does not 
find an independent contribution of a component in a technology 
combination patent, presuming that the court would fix a narrow 
 
 142 Id. (citing Oka, 849 F.2d at 583). 
 143 Id. 
 144 This difference perhaps results from the fact that with many biological or 
chemical inventions, the result and techniques may be completely new and not 
known among other practitioners in the field.  Therefore, a simple description of the 
predicted end result is insufficient.  See Oka, 849 F.2d at 583 (stating that, usually, de-
scription is enough when conventional methods in the field are used because “the 
question of whether the conceiver was in possession of a method of making it is simp-
ly not raised”). 
 145 See generally Amgen, 927 F.2d 1200. 
 146 Augustine Med., Inc. v. Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1301–02 (Fed. Cir. 
1999) (citing Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1532 
(Fed. Cir. 1987); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 720 F.2d 1572, 1579 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983)). 
 147 The doctrine of equivalents is explained and developed in a long line of pre-
cedents; it typically broadens the scope of claims beyond their literal language.  See, 
e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); 
Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).  A “liberal 
range of equivalents” would further expand that scope.  Northwest Engineering 
Corp. v. Keystone Driller Co., 70 F.2d 13, 15 (7th Cir. 1934). 
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range of equivalents is reasonable and thus makes a finding of in-
fringement less likely before the damages phase is even reached.
148
  If 
there is no infringement, no damages award can be made, and the 
goal of controlling such awards is ultimately met without resort to a 
mandatory-apportionment analysis. 
The court’s subtle incorporation of the principles underlying 
apportionment in the context of claim construction is important be-
cause claim construction is a vital step in any infringement analysis.
149
  
This process has necessarily come to incorporate the nuances of the 
art embodied in vast numbers and types of inventions.  Notably, be-
cause the technology sector is particularly concerned with ensuring 
that apportionment happens in cases involving its patents, courts im-
plicitly examine an invention’s contribution over prior art in deter-
mining claim scope. 
In addition to effectively performing apportionment where ap-
propriate during claim construction, courts already have the oppor-
tunity to use apportionment during a patent-infringement damages 
calculation.
150
  The seminal Georgia-Pacific
151
 case, listing the hypothet-
ical license factors useful to courts in fashioning damages awards, 
suggests that “[t]he utility and advantages of the patent property over 
the old modes or devices, if any, that had been used for working out 
 
 148 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit may have accomplished the 
same result with language more closely mirroring the legislative proposal.  That 
court suggested that determining “the place of the invention in the art and the extent 
of its contribution over the prior art” is of fundamental significance in claim construc-
tion.  Northwest Engineering Corp., 70 F.2d at 15–16 (quoting Johnson Bros. Engineer-
ing Corp. v. Masters, 49 F.2d 187, 190 (7th Cir. 1931)) (emphasis added). The court 
suggested that “[i]f the patent covers an invention of much merit—marks a long step 
upward over the prior art—then neither the specifications nor the claims should be 
read literally.”  Id. (quoting Johnson Bros. Engineering Corp., 49 F.2d at 190).  This 
precedent, however, does not bind the current appellate arbiter of patent suits, the 
Federal Circuit. 
 149 5A DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 18.03 (perm. ed., rev. 2007) (“De-
termination of infringement of a patent requires construction of the meaning of the 
patent’s claim (or claims) and then application of the claim as construed to the ac-
cused product or process.”). 
 150  See, e.g., Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1332–33 (Fed. Cir. 
2009) (noting, in the context of a discussion of the court’s reasons for vacating a 
damages award, that “the infringing feature . . . is but a tiny feature of one part of a 
much larger software program” and concluding that “the infringing use of Outlook’s 
date-picker feature is a minor aspect of a much larger software program and . . . the 
portion of the profit that can be credited to the infringing use of the date-picker tool 
is exceedingly small”); see also id. at 1336–38 (discussing the entire market value 
rule). 
 151 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), modified but method of calculating damages aff’d, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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similar results” are relevant.152  While attempts to codify this factor 
would aim to promote certainty and uniformity of damages awards, 
the option to rely upon it has been available to courts and litigants 
for over thirty years.  If courts have used other factors instead, the 
particular invention in front of each court may simply warrant a dif-
ferent set of considerations; the court or jury need not have intended 
solely to grant a large damages award.
153
 
An equally significant element of patent jurisprudence meriting 
retention of the current approach involves the continual self-
adjustment of the patent system.
154
  A brief history of the nonobvious-
ness requirement is instructive in this regard.
155
  In 1941, the Supreme 
Court indicated that a “flash of creative genius,” an arguably high 
threshold, served as a patentability requirement.
156
  The standard 
then evolved to require that an invention be somehow greater than 
the “sum of its parts.”157  Later, in Graham,158 the Supreme Court ex-
panded on the legislative requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 103 and enun-
ciated a three-part test for obviousness inquiries that compares the 
prior art in a given field to the claims of a patent.
159
  The Graham test 
also provided for assessment of other, somewhat subsidiary, consider-
ations.
160
  When the patent system had arguably become too lax re-
garding the nonobviousness requirement,
161
 the Supreme Court’s de-
cision in KSR
162
 conceivably circulated back in the direction of stricter 
patenting standards by raising the possibility that more patents would 
 
 152 Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 1120. 
 153 See Crouch, supra note 83 (stating that, because certain courts already carry out 
functions like considering an invention’s contribution, “legislation advocates may 
refer to the damages reforms as simply a clarification that limits the actions of rogue 
courts”). 
 154 See supra notes 3–5 and accompanying text. 
 155 KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 531–36, contains a useful overview of the history 
of the nonobviousness provision.  This Comment highlights the major elements of 
this overview to indicate the section’s progression. 
 156 Cuno Engineering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941). 
 157 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 
(1950). 
 158 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 159 Id. at 17 (explaining that nonobviousness analysis involves determining “the 
scope and content of the prior art . . . [the] differences between the prior art and the 
claims at issue . . . and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art”). 
 160 Id. at 17–18.  These considerations include “commercial success, long felt but 
unresolved needs, [and] failure of others.”  Id. at 17. 
 161  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 4, at 8, 11–12. 
 162 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
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be deemed invalid for obviousness,
163
 though the lasting effects of the 
decision remain to be seen.  In response, the lower courts have inter-
preted the Supreme Court’s pronouncement to recommend precise-
ly that course of action.
164
  This jurisprudential intervention, whether 
or not intended as a statement about the proper boundaries of the 
patent system, functionally accomplishes precisely that result by rul-
ing on the implementation of a particular aspect of that system. 
The evolution of the nonobviousness requirement indicates that 
courts remain alert to the dynamics of the patent system.
165
  If one 
area has become unwieldy and threatens the credibility of the larger 
system, the courts are fully capable of shifting the focus to accommo-
date industry users’ perceived needs without drastic legislative inter-
vention.
166
  The argument applies with equal force to damages 
reform.  Concerns about damages awards are best addressed by the 
courts because courts are the most institutionally competent bodies 
to produce results that accommodate the ever-changing needs of ent-
ities in the business of developing new products and technologies. 
A counterargument to retaining the current approach might 
point to accusations of an “anticommons” effect.167  According to this 
theory, “important patented upstream technologies will be unde-
rused” because multiple patents on that subject matter will act as a 
disincentive to other inventors.
168
  These inventors will be averse to 
navigating what may be a complex web of license negotiations.
169
  The 
phenomenon is said to be especially significant in the biotechnology 
sector,
170
 which is alarming because of the perceived impact on inno-
vation in important areas of science and medicine.  A hypothetical 
argument might posit that if the system tolerates an anticommons ef-
 
 163 The Supreme Court, in holding that the TSM test is a “helpful insight” but is 
not the exclusive means of proving obviousness and thus negating validity, implicitly 
suggested that more avenues would be considered viable ways of invalidating patents 
on obviousness grounds.  Id. at 418–19. 
 164 See, e.g., Ball Aerosol v. Ltd. Brands, 555 F.3d 984, 991 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (apply-
ing KSR, 550 U.S. at 420–21, in finding claims in suit to be obvious). 
 165 See supra notes 155–64 and accompanying text. 
 166 Obviousness is not the only example of this judicial self-regulation.  Recently, 
the Federal Circuit presumably imposed a measure of limitation on the scope of pa-
tentable subject matter in the context of method claims.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 
943, 949, 951, 954, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2735 
(2009). 
 167 Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 
385, 394 (2007). 
 168 Id. at 395. 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
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fect that suppresses innovation, its fundamental premises need great-
er oversight in the form of legislation.  Damages would fall into the 
category of fundamental because they are a significant remedy under 
the patent laws. 
But empirical research simply does not support the anticom-
mons notion.
171
  The much-hyped phenomenon apparently has not 
affected biomedical research.
172
  While there may certainly be a po-
tential for problems to arise, an open source or shared usage para-
digm borrowed from the information-technology world is beginning 
to develop in the biotechnology world.
173
  While the idea is still young 
and major pharmaceutical companies still rely on the patent system,
174
 
this parallel movement shows that the patent system, as currently 
constituted and perhaps in conjunction with modes of innovation, is 
perfectly capable of adapting itself to the demands of rapidly evolving 
technologies and industries.  This adaptability applies with equal 
force to perceived problems with damages awards. 
C.  Normative Reasons for Retaining the Current Approach over 
Mandatory Apportionment 
Support for the current damages system has spread outside the 
realm of the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.  President 
George W. Bush’s administration expressed its reservations about 
moving away from the current approach because such a shift may 
promote infringement and reduce the incentive function of patent 
law.
175
  Importantly, the administration stated that “encouraging in-
vention within particular business models or technology sectors must 
not come at the expense of innovation in others,”176 which the pro-
posed apportionment approach would likely do.  Instead, 
“[i]nnovation . . . will be encouraged in all industries by giving 
[f]ederal judges the flexibility to apply appropriate economic prin-
ciples to the facts of each case, consistent with the business model or tech-
nology.”177  This language continues the theme of the Federal Circuit’s 
recognition that each type of invention poses unique challenges that 
 
 171 Id. at 395–97. 
 172 Id. at 395. 
 173 Joly, supra note 167, at 391–94. 
 174 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
 175 See Wienecke, supra note 34, at 2. 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. (emphasis added). 
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merit close consideration and adaptation of general patent-law prin-
ciples to the facts in each case.
178
 
Given certain industries’ opposing views of the utility of the pa-
tent system and proper calculation of damages,
179
 analyzing the po-
tential effects of mandatory apportionment on each side is helpful.  
In a variation on a common formulation appearing in proposed sta-
tutes, apportionment would focus on a “specific contribution over 
the prior art.”180  This language connotes a per se requirement for ac-
tual, tangible improvement or benefit to the public.  Satisfying this 
element for technology inventions would not pose insurmountable 
difficulties because demonstrating the utility of these products is of-
ten straightforward.
181
  For mechanical inventions, the inventor can 
easily provide diagrams or pictures that highlight the functionality 
and “physicality” of the device.182  But the utility requirement is more 
difficult to meet for chemical, pharmaceutical, and biological inven-
tions, which may “possess an evolving utility” in many instances.183  
Even if this dichotomy is unobjectionable and can be accommodated 
during the examining phase, effectively permitting a utility require-
ment at the damages phase would unfairly subject pharmaceutical pa-
tents to an additional post-grant hurdle that many technological in-
ventions do not encounter.
184
  Adding a supplementary utility 
requirement will tend to make enforcement of a patent more diffi-
cult, will deter companies from seeking patent protection if the pa-
tent’s enforceability is dubious, and will therefore deprive the public 
 
 178 See supra Part III.B. 
 179 See supra Part II.B. 
 180 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)). 
 181 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740. 
 182 KIEFF ET AL., supra note 43, at 740. 
 183 Id.  The difficulty that science-based inventions face with regard to meeting the 
utility requirement is evident in a Supreme Court case that set a high standard for 
utility of processes and appeared to minimize the role of implements to further 
scientific research.  Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 531–36 (1966) (“But a patent 
is not a hunting license.  It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion.”).  Interestingly, some have disputed this position, including 
the venerable Judge Rich.  See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 949 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Rich, J., 
dissenting) (“I believe . . . that usefulness to chemists doing research on steroids, as 
intermediates to make other compounds . . . is sufficient.”); see also Brenner, 383 U.S. 
at 536–40 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 184 See Opderbeck, supra note 88, at 166–70. 
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of drugs or drug precursors that could prove infinitely valuable at 
some future date. 
A number of commentators and government entities suggest 
that the Patent and Trademark Office issues unworthy patents and 
that the patent system is seriously flawed.
185
  The workings of the of-
fice and quality of issued patents may indeed be problematic, but var-
ious provisions of the 2009 Act address some of these perceived prob-
lems before the issue of damages even arises.  Apportionment, which 
would take place at the damages stage long after a patent is granted 
and liability is determined, would not be effective in addressing the 
quality of an issued patent.  Other solutions would confront patent 
quality and examination problems at an earlier stage and thus more 
effectively.  For example, the 2009 Act would convert the U.S. patent 
system from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file procedure and thereby 
eliminates the need for interference proceedings.
186
  Interference 
proceedings can delay or prevent the issuance of a patent and there-
fore can serve as an impediment to any commercial success that a 
putative patentee may anticipate.  The 2009 Act also discusses de-
tailed prior-art submission and post-grant opposition procedures, 
 
 185 See, e.g., Harkins, supra note 20, at 432–33 (stating that “patent quality is a ge-
nuine topic for debate” and that only allowing issuance of high-quality patents has 
“proven to be an elusive goal and perhaps an unattainable target to date”); see also 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO 
BETTER MANAGE PATENT OFFICE AUTOMATION AND ADDRESS WORKFORCE CHALLENGES 1 
(2008) (Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Court, the Internet, and Intellectual 
Property, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Statement of Anu K. Mittal, Director, Science 
and Technology Issues, and Linda D. Koontz, Director, Information Management 
Issues), available at http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS64135 (“Rapid growth in 
both the volume and complexity of patent applications to [the] USPTO has leng-
thened the time needed to process patents and has raised concerns among intellec-
tual property organizations, patent holders, and others about the quality of the pa-
tents that are issued.”). 
 186 Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 610, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 17, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th 
Cong. § 2 (2009) (as referred to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent 
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009) (as referred to H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009).  Priority in the U.S. patent system is unlike other coun-
tries in that it allows an inventor who filed second to still obtain a patent on his in-
vention if he can prove that his invention date is earlier than the other party’s inven-
tion date.  See 3A CHISUM, supra note 149, § 10.01.  In other words, the United States 
will grant a patent to the first inventor, as long as his invention meets the statutory 
predicates.  In other countries, the filing date is dispositive; the first party to file is 
the only party who can patent that invention.  Id. 
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which are aimed at improving the quality of issued patents and allow-
ing cancellation of invalid claims.
187
 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO APPORTIONMENT 
A. The Best Bet: Elimination of the Reasonable-Royalty Floor 
The current version of 35 U.S.C. § 284 sets “reasonable royalties” 
as the mandatory minimum damages award for patent infringe-
ment.
188
  Damages for patent infringement are meant to compensate 
the patentee for his loss and are not computed with reference to the 
gain or loss of the infringer.
189
  Assuming that, in some instances, a 
patent holder has absolutely no financial loss resulting from the in-
fringement, such as when the patented and putatively infringing 
products are sold in completely different markets or the patented 
product is not sold or licensed at all, why Congress would insist on 
setting a minimum is peculiar.  But instead of guaranteeing only no-
minal damages plus a mandatory injunction or even nominal damag-
es alone, Congress left the minimum at a reasonable-royalty level.  
Courts have supplied a rich body of jurisprudence regarding the de-
finition of the statutory language.  In many cases, courts have 
adopted a test that “envisions and ascertains the results of a hypothet-
ical negotiation between the patentee and the infringer at a time be-
fore the infringing activity began.”190 
One way to change this established law on infringement damag-
es is to eliminate the reasonable-royalty floor.  This modification 
could introduce into the patent system a number of benefits.  With-
out a reasonable royalty standard, a smaller or independent inventor 
on a strict litigation budget could seek nominal damages and an in-
junction rather than going through the expense and time of provid-
ing evidence for a hypothetical license negotiation in a past or hypo-
thetical market.
191
  The inventor would not have to hire a high-priced 
 
 187 S. 515 § 5; H.R. 1260 § 6.  Senator Kyl’s version also includes sections on “Post-
Grant Review Proceedings” and “Submissions by Third Parties and Other Quality 
Enhancements.”  S. 610 §§ 5, 7. 
 188 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006). 
 189 Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964) 
(quoting Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565, 582 (1895)). 
 190 Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 869–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (citing Riles v. Shell Exploration & Prod. Co., 298 F.3d 1302, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 
2002)), vacated, 545 U.S. 193 (2005). 
 191 See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified on other grounds, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971). 
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expert in economics to address the Georgia-Pacific factors,
192
 which 
would be an attractive idea if lower expenses would reduce the bar-
rier to enforcing the patent via litigation.  Although few, if any, inven-
tors or patent holders would sue for nominal damages, an injunction 
may be quite valuable in a practical sense.  The threat of injunction 
can be a powerful tool for an inventor to wield in negotiations with 
potential infringers.
193
  Injunctive relief may not be as certain as it was 
even several years ago, but it is still available if a patentee establishes 
the traditional equitable factors warranting this remedy.
194
 
By eliminating the reasonable-royalty minimum, Congress would 
not concurrently eliminate a patentee’s prospect of damages.  Rea-
sonable royalties could represent one option for damages rather than 
the mandatory minimum award.  Also, if the patentee, perhaps an 
independent inventor or small company, could show actual damages 
and chooses not to seek reasonable royalties, the lost-profits measure 
of damages would still be available.
195
  If litigation costs are less prob-
lematic, however, reasonable royalties as a measure of damages would 
still be available.  The system might simply experience a downward 
adjustment in the number of suits in which reasonable royalties are 
sought. 
Additionally, allowing a damages award to take the form of no-
minal damages and permitting such results to become commonplace 
could have a subsidiary effect of reducing the demand for “patent 
trolls”196 that have leverage simply because the patentee is a small-time 
entity without a budget to fund infringement litigation.  Even if pa-
tent trolls perform at least some beneficial functions, such as market 
clearing and highlighting otherwise obscure prior art,
197
 that good 
work would be preserved because the market in which they work 
would continue to exist.  Less pressure would be placed on indepen-
dent inventors to relinquish their rights to trolls because the inven-
tors could afford to enforce the patents on their own.  Demand for 
 
 192 Id. at 1120. 
 193 See, e.g., supra notes 103–06 and accompanying text.  Research in Motion set-
tled for an enormous amount of money because the threat of BlackBerry users losing 
their service was a shudder-inducing prospect not only for the company but also for 
its many customers.  See Ken Belson, Not the End of the World After All, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
26, 2006, § 4, at 2; supra note 106. 
 194 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–92 (2006). 
 195 See Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th 
Cir. 1978). 
 196 Harkins, supra note 20, at 410; see also supra notes 98–106 and accompanying 
text. 
 197 See McDonough III, supra note 107. 
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trolls would decrease and relieve, at least as to this issue, serious and 
likely justified concerns of large technology companies currently 
seeking reform.
198
  Presumably, the desire of non-practicing entities to 
purchase patents would decline without a guaranteed reasonable-
royalty award upon a finding of infringement.
199
  An allegedly infring-
ing company could rely on the prospect that nominal damages would 
be awarded and would be less likely to pay a high settlement.  This re-
ticence would reduce the incentive for a non-practicing patent holder 
to sue when it has no cognizable damages or an otherwise weak case.  
The fact that an injunction may be available does not change this 
scenario because patent trolls probably could not meet the heigh-
tened requirements.
200
  A practicing entity, such as a pharmaceutical 
or large technology company, presumably could meet the test, making 
an injunction a worthwhile companion to the prospect of nominal 
damages. 
Removing the reasonable-royalty floor could also work to the 
benefit of the pharmaceutical and chemical industries in that adjust-
ing the value of infringement awards downward would correspon-
dingly reduce the value of royalty stacking.
201
  While such issues arise 
often in the technology industries, given the “incremental”202 nature 
of the typical invention, similar problems may arise in the sciences.
203
  
If each individual royalty amount or a portion of the aggregated 
royalties is reduced, the overall cost of producing a composite inven-
tion and defending it in patent lawsuits decreases.  This result would 
reduce some of the concern inherent in royalty stacking. 
A counterargument might posit that an inventor would lack any 
incentive to litigate if he is only guaranteed nominal damages.  The 
 
 198 See Markoff, supra note 67 (referencing “Intel, Microsoft, I.B.M. and Apple” as 
companies that want to limit the strength of trolls and “small patent holders”); see 
also Patent Reform, supra note 1, at 4–8 (statement of Steven R. Appleton). 
 199 See Harkins, supra note 20, at 439–40 (suggesting that patent trolls derive moti-
vation and work, inter alia, by either prompting large settlements from companies 
averse to litigation costs or by “leveraging the acquired patents into a license mill . . . 
for royalty rates far in excess of the claimed invention of the threatened patent”). 
 200 These requirements are described in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 
388, 391–92 (2006). 
 201  For a brief competition-centered explanation of the notion of royalty stacking, 
see FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 20, ch. 2, at 32–33. 
 202 See Samuelson et al., supra note 31, at 2330 (discussing software). 
 203 See, e.g., Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 871 (Fed. 
Cir. 2003) (“[T]he number of patent licenses needed to develop a drug may also af-
fect the value placed on any single technology used in the development process.  The 
cumulative effect of such stacking royalties can be substantial, particularly when 
reach-through royalties come into play.”) 
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fact that the inventor would still have an option to seek lost profits or 
a reasonable royalty could force an infringing company to contem-
plate a license because any threat of litigation would prompt the 
company to consider the value of the patented invention in its own 
product.  If the patented component is valuable to that company, li-
censing could lead to a major reward for the inventor, particularly if a 
license agreement was reached before trial.  The downside to nomin-
al damages is that the patentee’s licensing power might instead de-
crease because a company may be more likely to infringe and risk a 
suit.  The solution to this dilemma is a strong right to injunctive re-
lief, but the case law is still adjusting on this issue.
204
 
Particularly noteworthy with regard to this counterargument is 
that, even under the above analysis, which appears initially to favor 
patentees over large technology companies, the company can none-
theless engage in a more considered, careful analysis of whether to 
seek a license.  If nominal damages would be the maximum exposure 
(aside from legal fees), a company making a highly intricate technol-
ogy-based product would likely feel less pressure to settle in situations 
such as that recently facing Research in Motion in the BlackBerry 
dispute.
205
 
B. A Statutory Damages Regime 
A statutory damages regime modeled on the copyright damages 
statute could accompany elimination of the reasonable-royalty floor 
in patent law.  Patentees would admittedly have little incentive to liti-
gate if nominal damages were the new statutory minimum and in-
junctive relief, although potentially helpful, was not certain.  Careful-
ly measured legislative relief could step in at this juncture.  Congress 
could decide to set a low statutory minimum within a schedule rather 
than retain the ambiguous “reasonable royalty.”206 
Plaintiffs in copyright-infringement suits can elect to recover “ac-
tual damages and any additional profits of the infringer” or, alterna-
tively, “statutory damages.”207  Statutory damages under this provision 
range from $750 to $30,000 per infringed work with the final award 
fixed at an amount the court “considers just.”208  Where a plaintiff 
 
 204 See eBay Inc., 547 U.S. at 393–94. 
 205 See Austen, supra note 106; see also supra text accompanying notes 101–104. 
 206 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).  Statutory minimums exist in copyright law.  See 17 
U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 207 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1)–(2), (b), (c). 
 208 Id. § 504(c)(1). 
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elects the statutory damages option, the copyright laws provide for 
adjustment of these statutory minimums upward for willfulness and 
downward for a lack of intent for or the absence of a reasonable be-
lief of infringement.
209
  A court may also consider factors in deciding 
an amount of statutory damages that include the “expenses saved and 
profits reaped by the defendants” because of their infringement and 
the plaintiff’s resultant lost revenues.210  Courts may, in the exercise of 
wide discretion, consider the “deterrent effect of the award on a de-
fendant and on third parties.”211  The copyright law also contains a 
provision that courts must remit statutory damages if an infringer 
reasonably and actually believed his infringement was fair use and 
qualifies as a nonprofit library or public broadcasting employee in 
the context of the infringing use.
212
 
Patent law could successfully adopt a similar statutory-damages 
framework that would address concerns about uncertain damages 
awards without diminishing the incentives for pharmaceutical re-
search.  Congress could set minimum and maximum amounts and 
the courts could supply the necessary interpretation.  The “expenses 
saved and profits reaped” factor could come directly from copyright 
jurisprudence
213
 because research in patent-eligible fields is likely to 
be hastened and the cost reduced if an infringer simply copies the 
steps of a patented and well-explicated invention description.  The 
infringer’s product would therefore reach the market earlier and 
more cheaply than would have been practicable in the absence of the 
infringement.  The notion of adjusting amounts upward and down-
ward within the framework according to culpability or lack thereof is 
already familiar to patent law
214
 and could become helpful in a new 
context. 
If Congress imported into patent law the copyright infringement 
damages framework, the need for the complicated reasonable-royalty 
calculation would be greatly reduced, as would the risk to the paten-
 
 209 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
 210 N.A.S. Import, Corp. v. Chenson Enters., Inc., 968 F.2d 250, 252 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(quoting 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14.04[B], 
at 14-41 (3d ed. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 211 Playboy Enters. v. Webbworld Inc., 991 F. Supp. 543, 560 (N.D. Tex. 1997) (ci-
tations omitted). 
 212 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).  This is the Teacher-Librarian-Broadcaster Ex-
ception.  4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHTS § 
14.04[B][2][b] (4th ed. 2008). 
 213 N.A.S. Import, Corp., 968 F.2d at 252 (internal quotations omitted). 
 214 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006); see also In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
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tee inherent in the process.  If a patentee alleging infringement 
thought that he might have difficulty proving actual damages, he 
would then have the option of proving a reasonable royalty amount.  
If the patentee had not previously licensed the patent in suit, making 
the computation of an “established royalty” difficult or impossible,215 
or if the alleged infringer had not executed licenses on similar pa-
tents, making establishment of a “rate[] paid by the licensee for the 
use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit” highly specula-
tive,
216
 the patentee may want to select the statutory damages option 
instead (if made available).  A guaranteed return—one more specific 
than the current statutory floor—upon an infringement finding 
would eliminate the possibility that a reasonable royalty would be set 
at a very low amount and would also work to make sure that the pa-
tentee is compensated for unquantifiable, intangible losses.  On the 
opposite side, statutory minimums would afford larger entities, par-
ticularly technology companies, notice of the amount for which they 
may be held liable for infringing a component patent in a sophisti-
cated, multi-part product.  This notice function lends more certainty 
to the area of damages awards than exists under the current reasona-
ble-royalty regime. 
A cautionary point arises by comparison to the copyright sta-
tutes.  Much of copyright law has evolved in response to new technol-
ogies,
217
 and one result is that the law contains various “special 
schemes” of statutory damages.218  The factors to consider in patent 
law, if Congress opts for a statutory damages regime, should not go so 
far.  In fact, several recently proposed factors would accomplish a 
shift too far in the direction of specificity and should be generally 
avoided.
219
 
 
 215 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970). 
 216 Id. 
 217 The legislative history to 17 U.S.C. § 102 suggests that Congress had to balance 
concerns about making sure to limit the scope of copyright without eliminating the 
possibility of protection for new types of expression.  CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT 
LAW: SEVENTH EDITION: 2008 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT 463–64 (2008) (quoting House 
Report on the Copyright Act of 1976, H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5659). 
 218 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 212, § 14.04[B][1][a]. 
 219 See Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. § 4(a) (2009) (as referred 
to S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 
111th Cong. § 5(a) (2009) (as referred to H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, Mar. 3, 
2009). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Damages apportionment favors inventions deriving from the 
technology sector at the expense of pharmaceutical inventions.  The 
nature of inventions to be patented in these industries differs to such 
an extent that, if an additional, post-grant requirement of damages 
apportionment is mandated, science- and pharmaceutical-based in-
ventions would be subject to greater hurdles in proving entitlement 
to damages
220
 while the concerns of the technology sector regarding 
high damages awards and hold-up would unilaterally be addressed.
221
 
To avoid thrusting this uneven effect upon the various industry-
level users of the patent system, Congress should not mandate dam-
ages apportionment.  Instead, Congress should allow the courts to 
continue adapting the current patent provisions to inventions in each 
particular case, which the courts have done successfully for decades.
222
  
The evolving jurisprudence on other provisions of Title 35 patenting 
requirements, such as utility and nonobviousness,
223
 illustrates that 
courts are fully capable of shaping the law to conform to the de-
mands of industry users without the need for potentially over-
restrictive legislative interference. 
In the event that statutory reform is unavoidable, legislative in-
tervention should be of a lesser degree than apportionment.
224
  Spe-
cifically, eliminating the current reasonable royalty minimum would 
deflate any artificially inflated damages awards by indirectly attacking 
a perceived patent-troll problem while declining to interfere with le-
gitimate patent rights.  Substituting a floor of either nominal or statu-
torily enumerated damages, while still permitting recovery of reason-
able royalties or lost profits if a patentee so elects, could address the 
concerns of the technology industry without creating additional post-
grant hurdles for the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.  An 
additional beneficial and patent-strengthening consequence of eli-
minating the current reasonable-royalty floor, one which also ad-
dresses patent trolls, lies in the encouragement of small inventors to 
retain their patents and enforce them if litigation costs are reduced. 
 
 220 S. 515 § 4(a) (adding 35 U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); H.R. 1260 § 5(a) (adding 35 
U.S.C. § 284(c)(1)(C)); see supra Part II.B. 
 221 See supra Part II.B. 
 222 Indeed, the new gatekeeper provision may do just that.  See supra note 9. 
 223 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2006). 
 224 See supra Part IV. 
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At the most basic level, the U.S. patent system is meant “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”225  Although the 
contours of patent protection have expanded and contracted over 
time, this bedrock remains unchanged.  An approach to patent 
reform that stifles innovation in science-based industries while mani-
pulating the system in favor of technology companies would funda-
mentally hinder that purpose.  Responding to the complaints of 
technology companies with apportionment is particularly dangerous 
because large technology companies often forgo or minimize the role 
of patent protection and instead exploit their inventions through 
cross-licensing and reliance on market power.
226
  Thus, while the 
main beneficiaries of damages apportionment would see only mar-
ginal improvement, other industries may experience substantial wea-
kening in the very foundations of their respective industries.  The pa-
tent laws should not cease to perform their incentive function simply 
because the legal framework no longer fits an industry’s business 
model, such as, in this case, that of the technology companies.  While 
the patent laws need not apply in an unduly rigid fashion that ignores 
the needs of patentees and potential patentees, they must perform in 
an evenhanded and effective way.  Apportionment does not seek to 
achieve that end in every case and should be avoided in resolving de-
bates over proper application of the patent laws. 
 
 
 225 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 226 See supra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
